

The Role of Internal and External Religious Beliefs on Amount of Hope Prisoners in Sirjan City

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this research was to determine the effects of internal and external religious beliefs on amount of hope prisoners in Sirjan city. This study was conducted using the descriptive methodology. The statistical Population of this research are all prisoners in Sirjan city. 78 mens and womens were randomly selected for this research. To examine the hope and attitude religious prisoners questionnaire was used. The results showed that the correlation between inner religious beliefs and prisoners Hopefully are ($r = 0.27$). With 95% confidence we can say that there is a significant relationship between these two variables. According to the results is recommended in rehabilitation and prisons centers with Hopefully prisoners can made a different and right way for Living prisoners future.

Keywords: Religious Beliefs, Hope, Prisoners, Sirjan.

Introduction

Substantive principles of constitutional law determine when courts must resolve threshold questions about religion. If, for example, the government has a special constitutional obligation to accommodate religious use of drugs, courts must decide if certain claims to use drugs are truly religious. If, instead, the law allowed no distinction between religious and other uses, then a court would not need to determine whether a particular claimant's use was religious. Given the costs of religious cognition misperceiving reality as phantom infested, frequent prostrations before icons, the sacrifice of livestock, repetitive terrifying or painful rituals,

investment in costly objects and architecture, celibacy, religious violence and non-reciprocal altruism, to name a few it seems selection should have weeded out any religious tendency. Religious cognition presents significant explanatory questions to those interested in the evolutionary biology of our species. Suppose the function of cognition, in the widest sense, is to help an organism deal, in the widest sense, with environmental complexity (Godfrey-Smith, 2002). It is easy to appreciate how the ability to construct mental maps or for colour vision emerged in complex organisms given the enhancements to reproduction these

bring. However, a functional explanation for religious cognition is less obvious. Assume that gods do not figure as genuine aspects of environmental complexity. Traditional theories of religion provide a suite of candidate functions enhanced solidarity and coordination among the faithful, an answer book to life's riddles, an existential purpose generator, a means for providing hope and solace to the suffering, an adaptation for inter-group warfare, or for morality, and various combinations thereof (Preus, 1987). In an effort to understand the god-projector, what it does beyond warping the outlay of reality, the alien naturalist might look to how these distortions enable the religious to relate to and manipulate their world, and other people, in ways that bolster reproduction. Given the universality of religion, its strong motivational aspects, and behavioural consequences, venturing a functionalist explanation may seem irresistible. Viewing our species as one among many, an alien scientist might compare our strong and elaborate religious tendencies to the migratory instincts, territorial defence rituals, and intricate sexual displays of other animals compare (Laughlin and McManus, 1979; Smith, 1979). Noticing a discrepancy between the outlay of nature on the one side, and how religious persons understand and interact with their world on the other, the scientist might conclude that selection outfitted our species with internal god-projectors systems that distort experience to generate supernatural conviction, emotion, and behaviour. Here the poverty of stimulus could not be more extreme, nor could religious responses be more robust. But religious conviction and practice is extremely commonplace. It is universal among hunter gathers and emerges in all modern societies (Rappaport, 1999).

Archaeologists trace religion back to our earliest Sapiens progenitors (Trinkhaus and Shipman, 1993; Mithen, 1999). Atheism seems to be a relatively recent and rare phenomenon, and though secular pundits have long predicted the demise of religion, it continues to flourish. By the 1990s important experimental evidence began to emerge supporting Boyer's theory. The cognitive psychologists Justin Barrett and Frank Keil prompted religious devotees in American and India represented their gods in ways that made them far more anthropomorphic than the theologically explicit representations that these believers of each tradition consciously assent to in explicit doctrines and creeds (Barrett and Keil 1996). God or Shiva knows all, but you still need to pray if you want to communicate your intentions. This discrepancy between explicit theology and implicit religion has been duplicated in numerous experiments, revealing the gods of living religion to depart from the officially sanctioned versions theologians describe (Barrett and Keil, 1998; Boyer, 1998; Barrett, 2000; Boyer and Ramble, 2001). Interestingly, Boyer and Barrett's line on minimally counterintuitive agents patches an oversight in Guthrie's HADD based explanation. Clearly, the supernatural is never conceived as an ordinary agent (Boyer, 2003). There is always some conceptual twist. Satan is a talking serpent, not a serpent. Shiva has eight arms, not two. Ganesh doesn't just have a big nose; he's endowed with an elephant's trunk. If religion could be explained by HADD then we'd come to believe in ordinary persons animating the world. There are few absolutely universal rules in human culture. That religious thought always centres on non-natural or supernatural entities is one of them. The violation of natural expectation is what generates the

distinctively sacred quality of supernatural conviction. It is what causes one's neck hairs to stand on end. Thus in any instance where a religious concept flourishes, the precise brand of supernatural causation it supplies is attractive because it activates specific (and diverse) psychological systems. There is sense in which the particular form a religious concept takes owes to its adaptive features, and so the expression of a religious concept is the result of a selection process. This is true of many cultural products, from automobiles to videogames. However, the underlying psychological systems that accommodate religious concepts were not designed to process them for reproductive advantage. Like Boyer, Atran thinks religious information merely excites systems evolved for other purposes: "Religion has no evolutionary function *per se*. It is rather that moral sentiments and existential anxieties constitute by virtue of evolution ineluctable elements of the human condition, and that the cognitive invention, cultural selection and historical survival of religious beliefs owes, in part, to success in accommodating these elements. The aim of

this research was to determine the role of internal and external religious beliefs on amount of hope prisoners in Sirjan city.

Materials and methods

This study was conducted using the descriptive methodology. The statistical Population of this research are all prisoners in Sirjan city. 78 mens and womens were randomly selected for this research. Due to the large statistical population in this study, a simple random method were used for sample selection. To examine the hope and attitude religious prisoners questionnaire was used. The Pearson correlation coefficients and t independent tests were used for data analysis. The SPSS software were used for data analysis in this study.

Results and discussion

The correlation coefficients between religious beliefs and the hope are presented in Table 1. There was a significant correlation between two variables.

Table 1. The relationship between religious beliefs and the hope

Correlation Coefficient				
Variables	Number samples	of R ²	P-Value	Result
Religious beliefs - Hope	78	0.31	0.05	Relationship

The correlation coefficients between inner religious beliefs and the hope are presented in Table 2. There was a

significant correlation between two variables.

Table 2. The relationship between inner religious beliefs and the hope

Correlation Coefficient				
Variables	Number of samples	R ²	P-Value	Result
Inner religious beliefs - Hope	78	0.27	0.015	Relationship

The correlation coefficients between external religious beliefs and the hope are presented in Table 3. There was no

significant correlation between two variables.

Table 3. The relationship between external religious beliefs and the hope

Correlation Coefficient Variables	Number samples	of R ²	P-Value	Result
External religious beliefs - Hope	78	0.22	0.052	No relationship

The results showed that the correlation between inner religious beliefs and prisoners hopefully are ($r = 0.27$). With 95% confidence we can say that there is a significant relationship between these two variables. The relationship between public funding and religious providers raises special problems. Allowing public resources to purchase services provided by religious institutions or to finance religious instruction raises constitutional, political, and practical concerns. The involvement of religious and secular private providers of schooling, social services, and housing raises questions beyond the proper relationship between government and religion. They live in the Pleistocene and so can't rely on the police or the courts to enforce any of their agreements. Both stand to benefit from mutual aid, but as is so often true with reciprocity, both stand to benefit even more from defecting, receiving but not giving, the stuff of prisoner's dilemmas. Public funding of religious schools and religious social services departs from a conception of the Constitution's First Amendment as a mandate to separate religion and state. Public subsidies, even when channeled through vouchers redeemable by individuals, risk creating perceptions of government endorsement of religion. Given a scarcity of other good options, publicly funded vouchers may also pressure people into religious

activities that they would otherwise not choose. Fear of religious coercion or religiously motivated intolerance animates those who most steadfastly argue for separating religion and government, and thus religion and schooling. We know that the potential for defection poses no insurmountable barriers to reciprocity. Teachers' unions warn that school vouchers for private schools will drain needed resources and engaged families from the public school system. School vouchers may undermine state and national initiatives intended to raise expectations and student achievement if school systems use vouchers to send failing students to private schools exempted from those requirements.'⁸ For-profit prisons worry people who wonder if profits are made by skimping on legal protections or reducing the quality of conditions. Consider how religious coalitions are more effective than secular coalitions. Let's suppose Barney and Fred want to undertake reciprocal exchange. If we view religion as an aspect of the social mind, we can begin to understand how the excessive costs associated with it may actually be exquisite adaptations that selection targeted to enhance. Notice however that while religious individuals living among religious cohorts extract the full benefits available to cooperating groups, irreligious invaders will be even more handsomely rewarded, deriving all

the benefits of exchange but paying no cost for reciprocity. Organisms have evolved a suite of elaborate devices to secure and enhance co-operation. Dunbar presents plausible evidence that the evolutionary driver of our big brain was the presence of other people, for detecting and dealing with friend and foe in large social groups (Dunbar, 1998). While it is possible to explain costly religious behaviour as accidents, costly signalling theory enables us to view these costs as adaptations. Given the enhancements to individual life that comes through co-operation, it should be unsurprising that selection has outfitted us with dedicated cognitive equipment to secure it. Moreover the success of religious communes over their secular counterparts is evidence for religious altruism as a special form of social glue. Clearly religious communities are open to invasion. An individual who sees only natural causation will flourish among moral supernaturalists, and over time, naturalistic inclinations in her offspring will come to dominate mixed communities of religious altruists and irreligious defectors. It seems that secularist ballast over the long haul sinks religious reciprocity. It may be, of course, that altruists are more inclined to partake of ritual, rather than vice versa. But consider nature's economy. Only a committed Christian will endure a boring sermon week after week; a ritual to which many atheists would prefer the stimulation of dental surgery. Fasting on Yom Kippur or during Ramadan is an entrance requirement for many Jewish or Islamic communities, here again deprivation proving commitment. Buddhists must sit still for hours and do nothing pure torture for those not interested in Buddhist liberation. These rituals screen by imposing sensory deficits and extreme opportunity costs on those who partake of

them. It may be that the exchange-based understanding of religion is founded on too narrow a conception of reciprocity. Generalising, it is possible to view aspects of ritual activity described by cognitive psychologists in a different light. One reason rituals exhibiting flashbulb effects may be dramatic is that rituals frequently inflict punishment and ordeal to assess commitment. The drama comes from either enduring an ordeal or scrutinizing it. But the theory can explain repetitive religious rituals as well. The benefits uniquely available to social species do not just flow directly from the mutual aid-giving of co-operating individuals, but through highly indirect channels opened through group-level structures, which those engagements create and maintain. Where resources can only be acquired through the integrated action of several individuals, the functional organization of groups relative to competing groups may generate adaptive features at the group level (Hardin, 1995). Selection produces design through the differential success of replicating entities. Implicit in the adaptationist approaches I have been considering is the idea that selection operates on gene lineages through the differential reproductive success of religious individuals who propagate them. But selection may act at any replicating entity, given certain constraints (Sterelny, 2000). David Sloan Wilson has recently argued that the religious groups may function as adaptive units (Wilson, 2002).

Conclusion

According to the results of this experiment we conclude that in rehabilitation and prisons centers with hopefully prisoners can made a different and right way for Living prisoners future.

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